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Abstract
Relativism and expressivism oer two dierent semantic frameworks for
grappling with a similar cluster of issues. What is the dierence between
these two frameworks? Should they be viewed as rivals? If so, how should
we choose between them? This chapter sheds light on these questions. After
providing an overview of relativism and expressivism I discuss three potential
choice points: their relation to truth conditional semantics, their pictures of
belief and communication, and their explanations of disagreement.
1 Introduction
The last couple of decades have seen an explosion of work on relativism and
expressivism. However, the exact relationship between these two frameworks
remains unclear. This chapter aims to shed some light on this murky state of
aairs.
Both relativism and expressivism have been put forward in response to the
perceived shortcomings of a contextualist semantics. This chapter starts by briey
reviewing both contextualism (§2) and a major source of dissatisfaction with the
contextualist framework (§3). Next, it outlines how relativists (§4) and expres-
sivists (§5) try to improve on contextualism. The rest of the chapter canvasses
potential choice points for deciding between relativism and expressivism. I focus
on their relation to truth conditional semantics (§6), their conceptions of belief
and communication (§7), and their strategies for explaining disagreement (§8).
2 Contextualism
Contextualists about some expression emaintain that the truth-values of sentences
containing e are partially dependent on features of the context of utterance. A
particularly clear illustration comes from sentences containing indexicals, e.g.:
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(1) I am hungry now.
The truth-value of (1) depends on who is speaking, as well as the time of
utterance:
Contextualist Semantics for Indexicals (1) is true, as uttered in a context c
and evaluated at a world w, i the speaker in c is hungry at w at the time of
c.
While contextualism about indexicals is widely accepted, there is vigorous
debate about which other expressions should get a contextualist treatment. Here
I’ll focus on two controversial cases: moral discourse and epistemic modals.
First up: moral discourse. Consider a claim such as:
(2) Stealing is wrong.
One simple (some might say cartoonishly so) contextualist semantics holds
that moral claims are about the speaker’s attitudes, e.g.:
Speaker Contextualist Semantics for Moral Discourse (2) is true, as uttered
in a context c and evaluated at a world w, i the speaker in c disapproves of
stealing at w.
While few today would defend this particular semantics, more sophisticated
contextualist approaches to moral discourse have been defended by numerous
philosophers.1 For our purposes, this simple semantics is enough to highlight
the key contextualist idea, which is that utterances of moral sentences express
dierent propositions—and consequently vary in truth-value—depending on who
is speaking.
Next up: epistemic modals—i.e., uses of modal language (e.g., might, must,
possibly) to convey some distinctly epistemic species of possibility or necessity.
According to contextualism, epistemic modals communicate whether some em-
bedded proposition is consistent with—or entailed by—some body of information
determined by the context of utterance. To illustrate consider:
(3) It might be snowing.
Contextualists maintain:
Contextualist Semantics for Epistemic Modals (3) is true, as uttered in a con-
text c and evaluated at a world w, i the proposition ⟨It is snowing⟩ is com-
patible with the c-determined information at w.
1See, a.o., Dreier (1990); Silk (2016); Khoo and Knobe (2018).
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In the simplest case, the c-determined information is just the speaker’s. In other
cases, it might be that of some speaker-inclusive group, or that of some contextually
salient agent.2
This just scratches the surface. Contextualist semantics have been proposed
for a wide range of expressions, including gradable adjectives, conditionals, and
knowledge ascriptions. Rather than discuss these applications in detail, I now turn
to a common misgiving about contextualism—a misgiving that is often used to
motivate a shift to relativism or expressivism.
3 The Problem of Lost Disagreement
A common objection to contextualism is that it has trouble accounting for dis-
agreements.3 To introduce this concern, it is helpful to start once again with
indexicals. Suppose Aliya utters (1) (I’m hungry now) on June 4, 2019. Suppose
Bruno overhears her. It would be very odd for Bruno to disagree with her merely
on the grounds that he (Bruno) isn’t hungry.
Contextualism has a nice story about why there’s no disagreement here. Ac-
cording to contextualism, dierent utterances of (1) express dierent propositions
in dierent contexts of utterance. When Aliya utters (1), she asserts the proposi-
tion, ⟨Aliya is hungry on June 4, 2019⟩. And Bruno does not disagree with this
proposition.
But while this is a mark in favor of contextualism about indexicals, some have
argued that it is a liability for contextualism about other domains. Suppose Aliya
asserts (2) (Stealing is wrong). Suppose Bruno does not disapprove of stealing. It
would be natural for Bruno to disagree with Aliya’s claim by saying something
like:
(4) a. No [/that’s not true],
b. stealing isn’t wrong.
But why is this disagreement any more genuine than in the indexical case?
After all, on the Speaker Contextualist Semantics, Aliya’s utterance of (2) expresses
the proposition that she disapproves of stealing. But presumably Bruno does not
disagree with this proposition. Following MacFarlane (2014), call this ‘the problem
of lost disagreement.’
2Contextualism about epistemic modals is defended by DeRose (1991); Dowell (2011); Mandelkern
(forthcoming), a.o. The canonical contextualist semantics for modals more generally comes from
Kratzer (1981).
3See, e.g., Lasersohn (2005); Stephenson (2007); Egan (2007); MacFarlane (2011, 2014).
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This problem extends to other domains. Suppose that Aliya asserts (3) (It might
be snowing). And suppose Bruno overhears Aliya’s remark, having just come in
from the brilliant sunshine. It would be natural for Bruno to disagree with Aliya.
In doing so, Bruno need not disagree with the proposition that Aliya’s information
leaves open the possibility of snow.
The argument from lost disagreement is controversial. Some object that it
relies on naive assumptions about the disagreement data, or about how to set the
contextual parameters, or about the nature of disagreement.4 For present purposes,
I won’t take a stand on the merits of this argument. What’s important is that this
argument has been used to motivate a shift to an alternative semantic framework,
such as relativism or expressivism. Let’s take relativism rst.
4 Relativism
According to relativism, some sentences are assessment-sensitive. Even when one
xes the context of utterance and the world of evaluation, one has not thereby
xed the truth-value of the sentence. Rather, there is room for further variation in
truth-value depending on who is assessing the sentence for truth or falsity.5
To develop this thought, let an assessor be any agent who is evaluating an
utterance for truth or falsity. Let a context of assessment be any situation where
an assessor is making some such evaluation. For many purposes, it is convenient
to model a context of assessment as a centered world: an ordered pair of a world
w and an assessor a. Then we can give our Speaker Contextualist Semantics for
Moral Expressions a relativist twist:
Relativist Semantics for Moral Expressions (2) is true, as uttered in a context
c and evaluated at a context of assessment ⟨w,a⟩, i a disapproves of stealing
at w.6
Let’s see how this applies to our moral dispute. According to relativism, when
Aliya utters (2), the content of her utterance is a centered proposition: a set of
centered worlds. What is distinctive about this sort of content is that it can be true
for one person and false for another. It is true for her, since she disapproves of
stealing. But it is false for Bruno, since he does not disapprove of stealing. And
this, relativists claim, is why they disagree. (More on this in §8.)
4For arguments that contextualists can make sense of the relevant disagreement data, see, a.o.,
Dowell (2011); Plunkett and Sundell (2013).
5For a wide-ranging overview and defense of relativism, see MacFarlane (2014).
6Cf. Egan (2012).
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A similar diagnosis applies to modal disputes. Relativists agree with contex-
tualists that the truth conditions of modal utterances depend on some body of
information. However, relativists claim this information is determined by the
context of assessment rather than the context of utterance:
Relativist Semantics for Epistemic Modals (3) is true, as uttered in a context
of utterance c and evaluated at a context of assessment ⟨w,a⟩, i the propo-
sition ⟨It is snowing⟩ is compatible with the ⟨w,a⟩-determined information
at w.7
On this view, when Aliya asserts (3), she asserts a proposition that is true for
her (since her information leaves open the possibility of snow), but false for Bruno
(since his information does not). Hence they disagree.
5 Expressivism
Another response to the problem of lost disagreement is to go expressivist. Accord-
ing to expressivists about some sentence φ, the conventional function of uttering
φ is to express some mental state m of the speaker. This is typically paired with
the idea that the meaning of φ just is m; or, at the very least, that the semantics
and pragmatics of φ cannot be understood without reference to m.8
To esh this out, start with moral discourse. On a simple expressivist analysis,
the meaning of (2) is some mental attitude towards stealing. What sort of attitude?
Historically, expressivism has gone hand-in-hand with noncognitivism. According
to noncognitivism, moral beliefs do not aim to represent the world in the same way
that ordinary descriptive beliefs do. Rather, moral beliefs are conative attitudes:
desires, preferences, plans, states of approval/disapproval, etc. Thus a simple
expressivist analysis of (2) might go like this:
Simple Expressivist Analysis of Moral Discourse The meaning of (2) is the
mental state: disapproval of stealing.
How does expressivism help with the problem of lost disagreement? Typically,
expressivists adopt a ‘mind-rst’ picture of disagreement: disagreements between
speakers are explained in terms of disagreements between the mental states that
these speakers express.
7Relativist semantics for epistemic modals are defended in Egan et al. (2005); Egan (2007);
Stephenson (2007); MacFarlane (2011, 2014); Beddor and Egan (2018).
8Expressivism traces its roots back to the emotivism of Ayer (1936). Inuential developments
include Stevenson (1944); Blackburn (1993, 1998); Gibbard (1990, 2003); Schroeder (2008a).
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The idea that mental states can stand in disagreement relations is clearest
when it comes to factual beliefs. If Aliya believes that Singapore is to the south
of Kuala Lumpur, whereas Bruno believes that Singapore is to the north of KL,
then their beliefs disagree. More controversially, expressivists claim that there
are ‘disagreements in attitude’: disagreements between desire-like attitudes. As
Stevenson puts it:
Suppose that two people have decided to dine together. One suggests a
restaurant where there is music; another expresses his disinclination to
hear music and suggests some other restaurant. . . . The disagreement
springs more from divergent preferences than from divergent beliefs,
and will end when they both wish to go to the same place. . . (1944: 3)
Applied to our moral dispute: when Aliya utters (2) she expresses disapproval of
stealing. Bruno holds a dierent conative attitude towards stealing: he tolerates it.
This mental state disagrees with Aliya’s disapproval.
Not all moral expressivists equate meanings with mental states. Gibbard (2003)
takes the meaning of a moral claim to be a formal object that represents the
content of a conative attitude (more precisely: the content of some combination of
representational and conative attitudes). On Gibbard’s view, moral claims express
plans to adopt reactive attitudes, such as blame and outrage. But the content of (2)
is not itself a plan, but rather a set of world, hyperplan pairs. (Here a ‘hyperplan’
is a formal device representing the content of a special sort of plan. It’s a plan
that, for any possible situation and any possible course of action, takes a stand on
whether to pursue that course of action in that situation.) This gives us:
Gibbardian Semantics for Moral Discourse The meaning of (2) is a set of world,
hyperplan pairs, e.g.:
{⟨w,h⟩ ∣ h species a plan to blame those who steal at w}.
The dierence between the Simple Expressivist Semantics and Gibbardian Se-
mantics will be important when it comes to evaluating whether expressivism is
compatible with truth conditional semantics (§6).
What about epistemic modals? Expressivists about epistemic modals claim that
when one utters a sentence such as (3), one is expressing a credal state. Specically,
(3) expresses a credal state that leaves open the possibility that it is snowing.
The most thorough semantic implementation of expressivism about epistemic
modals is due to Yalcin (2007). Yalcin’s semantics closely parallels Gibbardian
Semantics. Like Gibbard, Yalcin adopts a modest extension of a possible worlds
semantics. Rather than taking the contents of sentences to be sets of world,
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hyperplan pairs, Yalcin takes them to be sets of world, information state pairs. An
information state s is a formal representation of a credal state. Simplifying slightly,
it is a set of worlds representing live doxastic possibilities. This yields:
Credal Expressivist Semantics for Epistemic Modals The meaning of (3) is
a set of world, information state pairs, specically:
{⟨w, s⟩ ∣ s includes at least one possible world where it is snowing}.
On this view, the semantic content of (3) is not itself a credal state. But it can
be thought of as representing a property of a credal state: roughly, the property of
assigning some positive credence to worlds where it is snowing.9
We have now laid out some of the key ideas behind relativism and expressivism.
How should we decide between these two semantic frameworks? In what follows,
I consider three potential choice points.
6 Truth Conditional Semantics and the Frege Geach
Problem
According to semantic orthodoxy, the meaning of a sentence is its truth conditions.
One advantage of this view is that it provides a constructive recipe for assigning
meanings to logically complex sentences on the basis of the meanings of their
parts. The truth conditions of ⌜φ or ψ⌝ are a function of the truth conditions of
φ, together with the truth conditions of ψ. So if meanings are truth conditions,
we have a nice story about how the meaning of a disjunction is a function of the
meanings of its disjuncts.
Relativism is perfectly consistent with truth conditional semantics. Of course,
relativists think truth conditions sometimes depend on the context of assessment.
But assessment-sensitive truth conditions are still truth conditions. As a result,
relativists have no diculty handling logically complex sentences, e.g.:
(5) Stealing is wrong or stealing is harmless.
9This approach bears important anities to dynamic semantics for modals, for example, update
semantics (Veltman 1996). According to a dynamic semantics, the meaning of a sentence is its
context change potential: its ability to make a dierence in the information of speakers and listeners.
Epistemic modals function as ‘tests’ on the context (modeled as a set of worlds). In particular,⌜Might φ⌝ tests to see whether the context contains at least one world where φ holds. There is an
interesting question as to whether update semantics should be classied as a type of expressivism.
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By contrast, many have thought that expressivism is inconsistent with truth
conditional semantics. To see why, recall that at least our Simple Expressivist Se-
mantics identied meanings with mental states. Such a ‘psychologistic’ semantics
is naturally construed as an alternative to truth conditional semantics.
If this is right, Simple Expressivism cannot use the standard truth conditional
strategy for explaining the meanings of logically complex sentences in terms
of the meanings of their parts. This is what gives rise to the notorious Frege-
Geach Problem: the problem of providing a plausible and principled expressivist
semantics for logically complex sentences such as (5).10 And this suggests a reason
for preferring relativism to Simple Expressivism. Since relativism is consistent
with truth conditional semantics, it avoids the Frege-Geach problem.
But before we place too much weight on this argument, we should bear in mind
that there are other semantic implementations of expressivism. Recall Gibbardian
Semantics, which identies the meanings of moral sentences with sets of world,
hyperplan pairs. As Yalcin (2012) observes, we can convert this into a truth
conditional semantics. All that’s needed is to take our circumstances of evaluation
to be world, hyperplan pairs. This gives us:
Gibbardian Truth Conditions (2) is true at some ⟨w,h⟩ i h includes a plan to
blame those who steal at w.
Similarly, Yalcin (2007) formulates his semantics for epistemic modals in truth
conditional terms, where truth is relativized to world, information state pairs.
Since our Gibbardian expressivist can assign truth conditions to moral sen-
tences, they can use the standard truth conditional strategy for explaining the
meanings of logically complex sentences. For example, they can say that (5) is true
at some ⟨w,h⟩ i either stealing is wrong is true at ⟨w,h⟩ or stealing causes harm
is true at ⟨w,h⟩.
From a formal perspective, Gibbardian truth conditions and relativism have
much in common. Both dene truth and falsity not just relative to worlds, but
relative to ordered pairs of a world and something else. For Gibbard, this something
else is a hyperplan. For the relativist, it’s an assessor. It’s natural to wonder: is this
a dierence without a dierence? Are the two frameworks notational variants?
Let me close this section by mentioning one way of trying to locate a genuine
dierence. Even if both relativists and Gibbardian expressivists adopt similar
formalisms, there may be important dierences in how the formalism is interpreted.
For Gibbard a set of world, hyperplan pairs represents the content of a ‘plan-
laden’ state of mind: a combination of planning states and representational beliefs.
10The locus classicus of the problem is Geach (1965). For an overview of work on the problem, see
Schroeder (2008b).
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Schroeder (2008a: 9, 2010: 131-133) questions whether the Gibbardian expressivist
can provide a systematic story about which plan-laden states of mind map onto
arbitrary sets of world, hyperplan pairs. An example: the content stealing is
wrong is a set of w,h pairs that maps onto a planning state (a plan to blame
thieves). The content of stealing causes harm is a set of w,h pairs that maps onto a
representational belief (the belief that stealing causes harm). But what about the
content of their disjunction? Gibbard has a recipe for associating this sentence
with a set of w,h pairs. But, the objection runs, he hasn’t told us how to make
intuitive sense of the state of mind that corresponds to this set.
By contrast, it is less clear that relativists face this problem. First, relativists
need not say that sentences express states of mind at all. Moreover, if they do say
this, it would be natural for them to hold that all declarative sentences express
representational mental states. When it comes to assessment-sensitive sentences, a
natural option is to conceive of the relevant representational states as de se beliefs.
This is particularly tempting for those relativists—such as Egan (2007, 2012) and
Stephenson (2007)—who follow Lewis (1979) in modeling the contents of de se
attitudes with centered propositions.
On this view, the state of mind expressed by (2) might be the de se belief that
one disapproves of stealing. And the state of mind expressed by (5) might be the
de se belief that either one disapproves of stealing or one inhabits a world where
stealing is harmless. This would allow relativists to avoid the burden of making
sense of disjunctions of representational mental states and conative attitudes.
This dierence is related to the issue of how relativists and expressivists should
understand beliefs on moral/modal matters, to which we now turn.
7 Belief and Communication
Consider the following belief reports:
(6) Aliya believes stealing is wrong.
(7) Aliya believes it might be snowing.
What sort of mental states do these reports ascribe to Aliya?
As standardly developed, relativism and expressivism yield dierent answers.
Start with relativism. On the most straightforward way of developing relativism,
(6) and (7) ascribe beliefs in centered propositions. As noted in §6, one natural
option is to think of this as a sort of de se belief. On this interpretation, (6) says
Aliya has a de se belief that she herself disapproves of stealing. And (7) says she
has a de se belief that her information is compatible with the possibility of snow.
9
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Thus developed, relativism construes moral and modal beliefs as beliefs about
one’s own mental states (states of disapproval or states of information). In the
terminology of Yalcin (2011), this makes moral and modal beliefs into second-order
states.
By contrast, expressivists typically adopt a rst-order conception of the relevant
beliefs. According to moral expressivists, (6) is true just in case Aliya disapproves of
stealing (or plans to blame thieves, etc.). On this view, moral beliefs are not about
conative attitudes. Rather, they are conative attitudes. Similarly, expressivists
about epistemic modals maintain that (7) is true just in case Aliya’s belief state
leaves open the possibility that it’s snowing. To have a modal belief, on this view,
is not to have a belief about one’s information state. Rather, it’s just to be in a
certain information state.
These two pictures of belief are naturally paired with two dierent pictures
of communication. Suppose we follow Stalnaker (1978) in holding that the goal
of making an assertion is to get one’s interlocutors to believe its content. Then
the relativist says that the goal of asserting some moral or modal claim is to get
your audience to share your second-order, de se belief. For example, the goal of
asserting (2) is to get your listener to believe that they disapprove of stealing. By
contrast, the expressivist says that the goal of asserting some moral or modal claim
is to get your interlocutors to share your rst-order mental state.
Which of these conceptions of belief—rst-order or second-order—is more
plausible? Dierent considerations pull in dierent directions. We’ve already
noted (§6) that the rst-order conception of moral belief faces the question of how
to make sense of combinations of representational and conative attitudes, whereas
the second-order conception avoids this issue. Another challenge facing rst-order
theorists is to make sense of degrees of belief on moral/modal matters. What is it,
to have, say, .7 credence that stealing is wrong, if moral belief is just a conative
state? By contrast, the second-order theorist has a comparatively easy time here:
just plug in your preferred theory of de se credences and you’ll get a theory of
moral/modal credences.
At the same time, other considerations motivate the rst-order conception.
Suppose the psychological tests are in: turns out you disapprove of stealing.
Does this fact provide a reason for you to believe that stealing is wrong? The
second-order approach says ‘Yes.’ But this seems counterintuitive. The rst-order
conception fares better here: while the test results show you do disapprove of
stealing, they do not show you should disapprove of it.11
Another argument in favor of the rst-order conception comes from moti-
11For similar arguments in favor of a rst-order conception of modal belief, see Yalcin (2011);
Moss (2013).
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vational internalism: the idea that moral beliefs directly motivate actions in a
manner similar to desires. If moral beliefs are conative attitudes, then we have a
simple explanation for how moral beliefs exert their motivational magnetism.12
By contrast, it’s less clear whether the second-order conception explains this. To
see why, suppose that (6) is true. According to the second-order conception, this
means Aliya believes that she disapproves of stealing. But presumably she could be
mistaken about this. If she is mistaken, why should we expect her to be motivated
to avoid stealing? Of course, motivational internalism is controversial. But those
sympathetic to it may regard it as counting in favor of the rst-order conception.
This suggests one important avenue for future research: compare the di-
culties facing the rst-order conception with those aicting the second-order
conception, and see which batch of problems proves more tractable.
But would settling this issue completely settle the relativism/expressivism
debate? Here we should proceed with care. While relativists often embrace a
second-order conception of moral/modal belief, it’s not clear that this is forced;
we might be able to develop a version of relativism that delivers a rst-order
conception. Here’s a sketch of how this might go. One way to compositionally
implement our relativist semantics for wrong is to use a contextual parameter
supplying a function from contexts of assessment to the actions the assessor holds
in disapproval.13 We could then propose that the attitude verb believes shifts
this parameter to a function from contexts of assessment to whatever actions
the believer holds in disapproval. This would predict that (6) is true, as uttered
in a context of utterance c and evaluated at a context of assessment ⟨w,a⟩, i
Aliya disapproves of stealing at w.14 For a structurally similar modication to the
semantics of believes designed to predict that (7) ascribes a rst-order state, see
Ninan (2018).
Taking stock: there are signicant dierences between the standard relativist
account of moral/modal belief and the standard expressivist account. However,
it would be hasty to conclude that this reveals an essential dierence between
the two frameworks. By combining relativism with a non-standard semantics
for belief reports, relativists may be able go a long way towards closing the gap
12See e.g., Blackburn (1998); Gibbard (2003): chp.7.
13A bit more precisely: let g be a function from a centered world to the set of things the center
holds in disapproval at the world. Then our relativist lexical entry for wrong might go like this:Jis wrongKc,g,⟨w,a⟩ = λx.x ∈ g(w,a).
14A toy implementation: let gwS be a constant function from centered worlds to the set of things
that S holds in disapproval at w. And let dox be a function from a centered world ⟨w,a⟩ to the set
of centered worlds compatible with what a believes at w. Then our semantics for believes might go
like this:JS believes φKc,g,⟨w,a⟩ = 1 i ∀⟨w′, x⟩ ∈ dox(S,w) ∶ JφKc,gwS ,⟨w′,x⟩ = 1.
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between the two views.
8 Explaining Disagreement
A further choice point between relativism and expressivism concerns their accounts
of disagreement. As we saw in §5, expressivists usually explain disagreements
about some domain in terms of disagreements in the mental states expressed.
When it comes to moral disputes, this will be a disagreement in conative attitudes.
Call this the ‘disagreement in attitude strategy.’
Relativists typically take a dierent approach. On a relativist semantics, the
content of Aliya’s utterance of (2) is inconsistent with the content of Bruno’s
utterance of (4b) (Stealing isn’t wrong). They are inconsistent in the sense that
there is no context of assessment where both are true. (Likewise, mutatis mutandis,
in the modal case.) A natural thought is that we can leverage this fact to explain why
their assertions constitute a disagreement. Call this the ‘discursive disagreement
strategy’:
Discursive Disagreement Two assertions disagree with one another i they
have inconsistent contents.15
Which strategy for explaining disagreement should we prefer? Unfortunately,
both face diculties. Start with the disagreement in attitude strategy. Proponents
of this strategy face the question: how should we understand disagreement in
attitude? Without some account, there is a worry that the expressivists are sim-
ply helping themselves to a phenomenon that they should be in the business of
explaining.
One option is to explain disagreement in attitude in terms of what MacFarlane
(2014) calls ‘noncotenability’: two attitudes disagree i it’s not possible to hold
both at the same time. One worry for this account is that it risks overpredicting
disagreements among de se desires. Suppose Aliya wants the last slice of cake.
Suppose Bruno desires not to receive the last slice. If we adopt Lewis’ view
of the de se, the content of Aliya’s desire is the centered proposition: {⟨w,x⟩ ∣
x gets the last slice at w}. (Or, to put it another way, what she desires is to have
the property: getting the last slice.) And the content of Bruno’s desire is the centered
proposition: {⟨w,x⟩ ∣ x does not get the last slice at w}. (Equivalently, what he
desires is to have the property: not getting the last slice.) Given this way of thinking
15See Egan (2007, 2012); Stephenson (2007). Note that Discursive Disagreement is also available
to certain expressivists. For example, while Gibbard himself pursues the disagreement in attitude
strategy, Gibbardian Semantics agrees with the relativist that (2) and (4b) have inconsistent contents:
there is no ⟨w,h⟩ where both are true.
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about de se desires, their desires are noncotenable. But, intuitively, there’s no
disagreement here.
While Aliya and Bruno’s cake-related desires are not cotenable, they are still
jointly satisable: there’s a way for both Aliya and Bruno to get what they want.
Perhaps then, we could say that two attitudes disagree i they cannot be jointly
satised. This is a more promising approach, but it still raises a number of questions.
First, what are the satisfaction conditions of the conative attitudes that constitute
moral judgment? Second, does this story generalize to handle disagreements
involving epistemic modals? (Do credences even have satisfaction conditions?) If
not, there is a worry that the disagreement in attitude strategy does not encompass
the full range of disagreement data.
Turn next to the discursive disagreement strategy. This strategy also faces its
share of challenges. For example, it faces a challenge accounting for what Beddor
(forthcoming) calls ‘speechless disagreements’: cases where two parties disagree
on some matter even though they never converse about it. (For example, Aliya
believes stealing is wrong, Bruno believes it isn’t, but they never talk about the
matter.)
To account for such cases, it seems that relativists, much like expressivists,
need to make sense of disagreements in mental states. Indeed, relativists might
explore analogues of the expressivist accounts of disagreement in attitude. For
example, they might propose that two beliefs disagree with one another provided
they are noncotenable. However, this proposal will run into an analogous worry:
it overgenerates disagreements in ordinary de se beliefs (e.g., Aliya believes she is
hungry, and Bruno believes he isn’t).
Alternatively, relativists might suggest that two beliefs disagree i they cannot
be jointly accurate, where a belief is ‘accurate’ just in case it is true relative to the
believer’s context of assessment (cf. MacFarlane 2014). But then they face the worry
of securing enough disagreement. Assume that relativists stick with the picture of
moral belief as a second-order, de se belief (§7). Then Aliya’s belief that stealing
is wrong is accurate just in case she disapproves of stealing. And Bruno’s belief
that stealing isn’t wrong is accurate just in case he doesn’t disapprove of stealing.
Since these beliefs can be jointly accurate, the proposal under discussion predicts
that they do not disagree after all. It thus proves challenging for the relativist to
avoid either overgenerating or undergenerating speechless disagreements.16
In summary, both expressivists and relativists face a number of diculties
when it comes to explaining disagreement. This should be troubling, given that
disagreement data was one of the main motivations for abandoning contextualism
16See Dreier (2009) for development of these concerns. For a proposed solution, see Beddor
(forthcoming).
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in the rst place! An important area for further research is to explore whether
these diculties can be solved, and—if so—whether the solution works equally
well in a relativist or an expressivist setting.
9 Conclusion
In this chapter we’ve examined dierent ways of developing relativism and ex-
pressivism, and considered various choice points.17 Along the way, we’ve found
that while there are important dierences between certain ways of developing rel-
ativism and certain ways of developing expressivism, it is much harder to identify
points on which all expressivists and relativists disagree.
This suggests that in order to make progress, we should go one of two routes.
First, we could try to develop a more rigorous characterization of both relativism
and expressivism: we could lay down necessary and sucient conditions for both.
We could then try to prove an impossibility result of the form: ‘No relativist view
can satisfy all of the conditions for being an expressivist view.’
Alternatively, we could give up the assumption that there are important ques-
tions that distinguish all forms of relativism from all forms of expressivism. Rather
than asking: ‘What are the reasons for preferring relativism to expressivism, or vice
versa?’, we should instead ask, ‘What are the reasons for preferring this particular
version of relativism to this particular version of expressivism, or vice versa?’
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